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Discounts on reparation for lost earnings 
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When criminal offending causes injury, the offender can be sentenced to pay reparation to 
the victim for lost earnings consequential on physical harm (Sentencing Act 2002, s 32(1)(c)). 
This reparation is in addition to the less-than-full compensation for lost earnings provided 
under the ACC scheme (s 32(5)). The courts have recently had to address the question of 
whether certain discounts (i.e. reductions) should be applied to such reparation. Here, I 
address three forms of discount that courts have applied in some cases: discounts for up-
front payment; because other ACC entitlements have been paid; and for the benefit of 
avoiding litigation. 
 
This piece repeats some of the points made in Craig Tatley and Simon Connell “Over and 
Above: Reparation for Lost Earnings Consequential on Injuries Covered under the Accident 
Compensation Scheme” (2020) 29 NZULR 119, but engages with cases that have become 
available since the article was written.  
 
While the leading case on calculating lost earnings for the purposes of reparation is Oceana 
Gold (New Zealand) Ltd v WorkSafe New Zealand [2019] NZHC 365, [2019] 3 NZLR 137, that 
case does not address the discounts discussed here. “Over and Above” also questions the 
Oceana Gold approach to calculation of lost earnings, but here I am only concerned with 
discounts applied after the lost earnings figure has already been determined. 
 
Discount for up-front payment 
 
Some cases have applied a “discount for up-front payment”, as the court put it in WorkSafe  
v Ask Metro Fire Ltd [2017] NZDC 13314 at [20]. This discount recognises that the victim is 
advantaged by receiving their lost earnings in advance where, had they not been injured, 
the payments would have been received over time. Since the payment is made up-front, the 
victim has the opportunity to earn interest. They may also be able to make a significant 
purchase, such as a business or new vehicle. The rationale for the reduction is that the 
payment ought to be reduced so that the claimant is not better off in terms of income than 
they would have been had the injury not occurred. 
 
For example, the Court in Ask Metro Fire at [20] stated that a discount for up-front payment 
was “[p]lainly … called for”, and the discount was calculated using an interest rate of 1.5 per 
cent. In WorkSafe v Wai Shing Ltd [2017] NZDC 10333, there was some discussion of the 
appropriate interest rate. The actuarial calculations provided by WorkSafe had used a “risk-
free” interest rate, which reflects the low rate paid by risk-free investments such as 
Government Bonds. Counsel for the offender argued for a slightly higher interest rate, on 
the basis that a reasonable and conservative investor would receive more than the risk-free 
rate. The Court found that “pragmatism and predictability” favoured the risk-free rate (see 
[43], [91]-[93] and [99]). 
 
In two more recent cases, the argument played out in a slightly different way, with the court 
weighing up whether the lost earnings reparation should be paid as a lump sum (with or 
without a discount), or weekly or fortnightly. 
 
In WorkSafe v The Homegrown Juice Co [2019] NZDC 16605, the court awarded reparation 
as a lump sum but applied a discount of 10 per cent, stating at [13] that “there is a 
considerable advantage in having a lump sum payment made”.  
 
Counsel for the offender in WorkSafe v Kiwi Lumber (Masterton) Ltd [2020] NZDC 19117 
invited the court to apply the same approach. However, the Court in Kiwi Lumber 
(Masterton) rejected the submission, stating at [28]: 
 
The courts however have in all cases awarded a lump sum amount and not made an order 
that a defendant pay per weekly or fortnightly payments to top up the balance. If weekly 
payments were the basis upon which cases calculated the consequential loss then there 
certainly should be some acknowledgement for a company volunteering to pay the full 
amount by way of lump sum (though I would have thought as a matter of logic that would 
have been best done, and usually done in a criminal setting, by way of discounting the 
sentence rather than reducing the amount to be paid to the victim). But that is not the way 
in which figures are calculated in the cases in this area, including in the High Court in 
[Oceana Gold]. 
 
In my view, the analysis in these two recent cases is somewhat misguided. The court in Kiwi 
Lumber (Masterton) correctly identifies that the usual practice is for a sentencing court to 
award reparation as a lump sum rather than via periodic payments, and sensibly ruled out 
periodic payment of reparation for lost earnings. 
 
However, neither Homegrown Juice nor Kiwi Lumber (Masterton) satisfactorily addresses 
the rationale for a discount for up-front payment. The argument for a discount for up-front 
payment can be seen as an appeal to the doctrine of betterment: a remedy should not put 
the claimant in a better position than they would have been in had the wrong not occurred. 
The courts have recognised that betterment is a relevant consideration in the context of 
reparation, see Sarginson v Civil Aviation Authority [2020] NZHC 3199 at [181] and 
Agricentre South Ltd v WorkSafe [2018] NZHC 2070 at [29(b)]. 
 
Betterment is a relevant concern when compensation is paid up-front for the loss of a 
benefit that would have been received over time. It is unfair to an offender to pay a sum 
greater than the victim’s loss. Kiwi Lumber (Masterton) does not address this. The discount 
for up-front payment is not simply to give the offender credit for volunteering up-front 
payment, in which case it would indeed make sense to reduce the fine rather than the 
amount of reparation payable. Instead, it is to counteract betterment, which is why it is the 
reparation award that is reduced. 
 
The misstep in Homegrown Juice, on the other hand, is to over-correct for the advantage of 
up-front payment and apply a 10 per cent discount. In the context of injury, in practice the 
advantage of up-front payment is a modest one. Victims of injury will need to draw on their 
lost earnings payments to pay for the costs of living (as they would have done with their 
income had they not been injured) and cannot simply treat them as an investment. 
Nevertheless, there is a benefit to up-front payment. Applying a discount using the risk-free 
rate strikes the right balance in terms of fairness to offender and victim. 
 
Discounts because of other ACC entitlements 
 
In several cases, counsel for the offender argued that reparation ought to be reduced 
because the victim has been paid entitlements under the ACC Scheme other than for lost 
earnings.  
 
In both Wai Shing and WorkSafe v Supermac Group Resources Ltd [2019] NZDC 15023,  
counsel for the offender tentatively raised the possibility that, because the victim had been 
paid lump sum compensation for permanent impairment, a discount should be applied to 
reparation. Both cases left the question open.  
 
The High Court finally addressed the question of a discount because of lump sum 
compensation for permanent impairment in McKee v WorkSafe [2020] NZHC 1002. Powell J 
dealt with the issue soundly and authoritatively, stating at [24]-[25] that the idea is:  
 
misconceived … a lump sum payable under the Accident Compensation Act is not 
compensation for lost earnings, with a result there is no basis on which to offset it against 
any reparation for consequential loss. Instead the legislation makes it quite clear that the 
lump sum is paid for permanent impairment … 
[T]he level of impairment is not influenced or affected by the extent to which the 
impairment has affected an individual’s capacity to work or weekly compensation – it being 
clear that the same injury could have a minor or a significant impact on a person’s capacity 
to work, depending on their occupation.  
In WorkSafe v Hamilton City Council [2016] NZDC 18590 and WorkSafe v Corboy 
Earthmovers Ltd [2016] NZDC 22290, [2017] DCR 118, both cases involving death in a 
workplace accident, the court appeared to accept that ACC payments for child care justified 
reducing an award of reparation. In Director of Civil Aviation v Sarginson [2019] NZDC 
24655, the court reduced reparation to take into account ACC child care and survivor’s grant 
payments. 
 
Sarginson was appealed, and the High Court applied the reasoning of McKee in the context 
of a fatal accident. Like Powell J, Mander J soundly and authoritatively rejected the 
argument that ACC payments that do not compensate for lost earnings should reduce lost 
earnings reparation, stating at [201]-[202]:  
 
Neither survivors’ grants or childcare grants are calculated by reference to the deceased 
earner’s prior income, nor do they address the loss of future earnings. They are fixed lump 
sums that are payable to family members upon the death of an earner. Eligibility arises as a 
result of the death of the family member, they do not constitute compensation for lost 
earnings. They arise from the event of death, without more, and bear no correlation with 
the income of the deceased earner, nor any resulting cost arising from the death or pre-
accident circumstances of the family. 
 
For these reasons, I consider the grants should be treated in a manner consistent with the 
approach taken by Powell J in McKee. Neither grant should be taken into account for the 
purpose of the statutory shortfall calculation … I accept that the childcare grant is likely 
directed at subsidising care arrangements that might otherwise have been provided by the 
deceased earner but the individual circumstances of each family and each case will vary 
widely and the sentencing court should not be required to inquire into that level of detail. 
The fact that the entitlement to the grant triggers in the event of a parent or caregiver’s 
death without more is sufficient to view it as a payment that directly arises from the harm 
caused by the death and one that is made in response to the loss rather than to compensate 
for any consequential pecuniary loss. 
 
WorkSafe v Alderson Poultry [2019] NZDC 25090 applied the same approach, see [80]-[81].  
 
Discount for avoiding litigation 
 
The pre-Oceana Gold cases Wai Shing and Ask Metro Fire applied a discount to reflect the 
benefit the victim received from the ACC Scheme. The court in Wai Shing set out the 
justification this way at [88]-[89]:  
 
The victim has avoided the time, cost and stress of litigation that would be necessary if we 
did not have the current system. The ACC scheme provides a degree of certainty to the 
victim. The victim has not had to initiate his own proceedings to benefit from the system. 
 
Any value one places on this benefit is arbitrary, but at the same time a significant value 
does need to be placed upon it to protect the integrity of the system and the societal 
benefits gained out of the no fault system. 
 
Oceana Gold did not expressly address the question of discounts. In Supermac, the District 
Court considered that Oceana Gold contemplated a “straight line calculation with no 
mention of discounting or deduction” (at [53]), and also rejected such a discount on 
principled grounds, stating at [52]: 
 
The ability to claim at common law for personal injury was removed when the Accident 
Compensation Scheme was introduced. That scheme has been described by the Courts as a 
social contract with the citizens of this country. It is difficult to rationalise why reparation 
should be discounted for the benefit of not having to go to litigation to recover 
compensation when that ability no longer exists. It is equally difficult to rationalise why 
reparation should be discounted because a given victim is receiving statutory benefits which 
are a right under the social contract. 
 
In WorkSafe v String’s Attached Ltd [2020] NZDC 13314, also decided after Oceana Gold, the 
court provided two further reasons not to make a discount for avoiding litigation at [22]. 
First: 
 
The benefits of the ACC scheme apply to both parties. The time, cost and stress created by 
civil litigation to recover losses (in the absence of an ACC scheme) would impact on both 
parties. Further, by reason of the ACC scheme, the defendant cannot be pursued for the 
amount covered by the ACC scheme and for the medical costs and related expenses that are 
also covered by the scheme. 
 
The second reason is that the Oceana Gold methodology for assessing lost earnings is 
“inherently conservative” (at [22]).  Indeed, the Court suggested that the methodology was 
“very conservative” when applied to the facts of String’s Attached (at [23]), because it did 
not capture the full extent of the victim’s actual loss. Thus, it would be unfair to add a 
discount to the advantage of the offender, when the offender is already advantaged by the 
way lost earnings are calculated. 
 
The more recent cases have the better approach. The benefit of the ACC scheme is properly 
taken into account by ensuring that the combination of ACC compensation for lost earnings 
and reparation for lost earnings does not add up to double compensation. No further ACC-




It is now clear that discounts should not be applied on reparation for lost earnings because 
of the payment of other ACC entitlements, or because of the benefits of avoiding litigation. 
In respect of these kinds of discounts, the courts have arrived at the approach Craig Tatley 
and I recommended in “Over and Above”. 
 
The question of whether a discount should be applied for up-front payment does not yet 
have a clear answer. Unlike the other two discounts discussed herein, I think there is merit 
to a discount for up-front payment. However, if such a discount is applied, it should be 
small, to recognise the reality of life for victims of injury.  
